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3Executive summary 
Malicious cyber activities have become a growing threat, a 
fact that has become more visible in recent years through 
several massive cyberattacks. While the European Union 
(EU) has been active in the field of cybersecurity for a 
number of years, it has not yet put in place diplomatic 
tools to respond to cyberattacks, nor has it attributed 
cyberattacks. However, EU member states have made 
progress in the development of a cyber diplomacy toolbox 
containing a number of measures, from preventive ones 
to the use of sanctions. This work needs to be finalised, 
so that the Union’s toolbox can become operational and 
used when needed.
This paper analyses the newly created framework for the 
EU’s diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities, 
the challenges that hamper a unified EU response and 
possible ways to address these challenges. It focuses on 
issues linked to the attribution of cyberattacks and on 
the most powerful diplomatic instrument to be adopted 
to respond to them: the use of cyber sanctions.
The attribution of cyberattacks poses a number 
of challenges, both technical and political. Many 
member states lack the required cyber and intelligence 
capabilities, and the political and administrative 
processes necessary to properly attribute cyberattacks. 
Moreover, attribution remains a political decision for 
national leaders to take and, like most foreign policy 
decisions, one influenced by diverse (geo)political 
considerations. To overcome problems of collective 
action and achieve unanimity in the EU Council on a 
common diplomatic response, EU member states and 
EU institutions should do more to develop common 
threat assessments and a shared culture of attribution 
of cyberattacks. For this, member states will need to 
upgrade their information sharing but also exercise the 
Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox. 
One of the key enablers for collective diplomatic action 
at EU level will be the necessary strengthening of cyber 
capabilities, both defensive and offensive. This will 
require investment in human and technical capacities, 
but also in creating and updating internal procedures so 
that the work of cybersecurity professionals feeds into 
the political decision-making process. While achieving 
unanimous agreements on attributing cyberattacks 
to non-EU countries will continue to be challenging, 
EU countries will still be able to use most of the 
framework’s tools. The most powerful ones, such  
as the public attribution of attacks or the use of 
sanctions will have to be wielded carefully, based on 
strong compelling evidence.
Cooperation with the private sector and with 
international partners should be pursued. The EU will 
need to set up an enhanced cybersecurity cooperation 
with post-Brexit Britain and further develop EU-NATO 
cooperation in this field. Continued investment in 
confidence building measures, in the development 
of norms at the UN level and in global, regional and 
bilateral cyber dialogues will be crucial to limit some of 
the alarming developments occurring in cyberspace.
While attributing attacks or adopting sanctions can 
potentially worsen relations with the particular country 
concerned, not reacting to cyberattacks is likely to 
encourage similar or even more damaging behaviour. 
The EU’s cyber diplomacy toolbox, with its attribution 
and sanctioning tools, is intended to play a role in the 
calculations of potential aggressors, acting as a deterrent 
against bad behaviour.
While the cyber diplomacy toolbox is complementary 
to actions by individual member states, acting together 
would allow EU member states to be more credible and 
send a stronger deterrent message. By responding to 
cyber threats as a united actor, EU countries will be 
better placed to defend their security, their political and 
economic interests and further enhance the Union’s 
credibility as an international actor.
Introduction: The warnings have become reality
Hospitals cancel operations, factories temporarily shut 
down, global companies are put offline, incurring huge 
losses – the growing risks posed by malicious cyber 
activities have become an unwelcome reality. The 
increasing number of cyber incidents has shown that 
different international actors continue to deploy malicious 
cyberattacks that can spread rapidly across borders, even 
beyond their intended targets, compromising ICT systems 
and causing significant damage. It is also evident that 
despite the international conversations on cybersecurity 
taking place at the UN, G20 or in regional formats, several 
states continue to employ cyberattacks against various 
entities in the European Union (EU).
Malicious cyber tools have been used by states for well 
over three decades. The 2007 cyberattacks on Estonia 
amid Tallinn’s disagreement with Russia about the 
relocation of a Soviet-era statue drew particular attention 
to this security challenge. More recently, Ukraine has 
also suffered a series of cyberattacks, including on its 
electricity grid, which temporarily disrupted electricity 
supply in 2015 and 2016.1
While cybersecurity incidents are a daily occurrence, two 
massive cyberattacks that spread at a global level and 
affected several EU member states in 2017 demonstrated 
the extent of the damage that malicious cyber activities 
4can inflict. In May 2017, the WannaCry ransomware attack 
quickly spread around the world, encrypting data and 
demanding ransom payments in the cryptocurrency Bitcoin. 
The attack was estimated to have affected more than 
300,000 computers across 150 countries2, causing between 
USD 4 to 8 billion worth of damages.3 Among others, 
carmakers Renault, Nissan and Honda were affected by the 
attack and were forced to reduce or even stop production 
at a number of sites in France, the United Kingdom (UK), 
Romania, Slovenia, Japan, and India.4 The attack also hit the 
national healthcare system in the UK, which left hospitals 
and doctors unable to access patient data and led to the 
cancellation of operations and medical appointments.5
In June 2017, the major NotPetya cyberattack spread 
from its target, Ukraine, to the rest of the world, affecting 
numerous companies in Europe. The attack severely 
affected the Danish company A.P. Møller-Mærsk, the 
world’s largest container shipping company, which saw a 
large part of its IT infrastructure taken offline, creating a 
loss of USD 200-300 million.6 Losses of similar size were 
registered by the pharmaceutical company Merck & Co., 
one of the largest in the world, which had to shut  
down production of one of its paediatric vaccines.7 
According to a White House assessment, the NotPetya 
cyberattack created damages amounting to more  
than USD 10 billion.8
Major attacks such as WannaCry and NotPetya showcased 
the potential destructive magnitude of malicious 
cyberattacks, which can have real-life consequences for 
people and infrastructures. The attacks also highlighted 
that advanced and digitalised economies are vulnerable 
to sophisticated attacks that can spread in a matter of 
minutes. Moreover, these widespread attacks highlighted 
the need for EU member states to act together to respond 
to and deter similar attacks. 
This paper analyses the development of the framework for 
the EU’s diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities, 
the challenges that hamper a unified EU response and 
possible ways to address these challenges. It focuses on 
issues linked to the attribution of cyberattacks and on the 
most powerful new diplomatic instrument to be adopted 
to respond to them, the use of cyber sanctions. Though a 
very important topic on its own, the paper does not cover 
the topic of digitally-enabled disinformation.
Major attacks such as WannaCry and 
NotPetya showcased the potential 
destructive magnitude of malicious  
cyberattacks, which can have  
real-life consequences for people  
and infrastructures.
 
The paper argues that EU member states and EU 
institutions should do more to develop common 
threat assessments and a common culture of 
attribution of cyberattacks. They should upgrade their 
cyber capabilities and learn to exchange information 
and cooperate better. Member states should invest in all 
the available tools in the toolbox and employ the more 
powerful ones based on solid proof and assessments. 
While member states can continue to face and respond to 
these threats separately, they are likely to achieve better 
results working together. Failure to react credibly to 
future cyberattacks is likely to encourage similar or even 
more damaging behaviour.
1.  The EU response: First steps
Recognising the reality of the threat, the EU and its 
member states have worked over the past few years 
to strengthen cybersecurity in Europe and tackle 
cyberattacks against infrastructures, cyber-espionage, 
intellectual property theft, and hybrid threats using 
cyber means. The Union has primarily invested in 
increased prevention, early warning mechanisms, 
resilience and coordination. 
The 2013 EU Cybersecurity Strategy, the 2016 Network 
and Information Security (NIS) Directive and the 2016 
Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats are major 
milestones. The NIS Directive, for example, required 
member states to be equipped to boost the overall 
level of cybersecurity in the EU by setting up national 
Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) 
and a competent national NIS authority. To facilitate 
strategic cooperation and exchange of information, it 
also established the NIS Cooperation Group, composed of 
member state representatives, the European Commission 
and the EU’s Agency for Network and Information 
Security (ENISA) and the CSIRTs Network, dedicated 
to sharing information about ongoing threats and 
cooperating on cybersecurity incidents.
Over the years, the EU has also dedicated resources 
to cyber diplomacy, both at the multilateral level and 
through bilateral relations. Since the early 1990s, the 
EU has been involved in the international debates 
on internet governance. The 2013 EU Cybersecurity 
Strategy has been a major step in the development of 
EU cyber diplomacy, placing the establishment of a 
“coherent international cyberspace policy for the EU” 
among its five priorities. Over the years, the EU has 
also developed cyber dialogues with partner countries, 
the EU-US partnership (now called the EU-U.S. Cyber 
Dialogue) being the most developed.
More recently, in 2017, the European Commission 
proposed a wide-ranging cybersecurity package to 
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response. In December 2018, the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission reached a political 
agreement on the Cybersecurity Act, which aims to 
introduce an EU-wide cybersecurity certification and 
to consolidate the European Union Agency for Network 
and Information Security (ENISA). As part of the same 
cybersecurity package, the Commission also proposed 
the creation of a network of Cybersecurity Competence 
Centres, a Cybersecurity Competence Community and a 
new European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and 
Research Competence Centre. The EU is also developing 
procedures to achieve a coordinated response to large-
scale cybersecurity incidents and crises.9
The increasing number and gravity of state-sponsored 
cyberattacks has also increased the political prominence 
of the challenge. While the EU has been dealing with 
cybersecurity for a number of years, steps to develop a 
joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber operations 
have only gained traction at the political level over the last 
three years. As illustrated below, some EU member states 
have in recent years attributed cyberattacks, publicly or 
not.10 However, the EU as such has generally not attributed 
cyberattacks and has not taken measures against the state 
and non-state actors which have been identified as the 
perpetrators of some of these attacks.
The EU as such has generally not 
attributed cyberattacks and has not taken 
measures against the state and non-state 
actors which have been identified as the 
perpetrators of some of these attacks.
 
During its 2016 Presidency of the EU Council, the 
Netherlands put forward a non-paper on “Developing 
a joint EU diplomatic response against coercive cyber 
operations.”11 The document argues that to influence 
the behaviour of potential aggressors and thus to 
reinforce the EU’s security it is necessary to clearly 
signal the consequences of malicious activities. 
The document also presents the main principles of the 
toolbox to be developed, among them the proposal that 
the EU response should “be proportionate to the scope, 
scale, duration, intensity, complexity, sophistication and 
impact of the cyber activity”. 
The work on the topic continued and, in June 2017, the 
EU Foreign Affairs Council endorsed the main principles 
of a framework for a joint EU diplomatic response 
to malicious cyber activities – the so-called Cyber 
Diplomacy Toolbox.12 The Council conclusions mention 
a series of possible measures within the framework of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that 
the EU institutions and member states could undertake, 
including the use of the most powerful tool – restrictive 
measures (sanctions). In October 2017, the framework 
was worked out in more detail with the adoption of a 
document containing implementing guidelines.13  
The measures of the EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox: 
 
q preventive measures, including confidence-building 
measures, awareness raising on EU policies, EU cyber 
capacity building in third countries; 
q cooperative measures, including the use of political and 
thematic dialogues and démarches; 
q stability measures, including statements by the EU High 
Representative and on behalf of the Council of the EU, 
EU Council conclusions, diplomatic démarches, signalling 
through EU-led political and thematic dialogues;  
q restrictive measures (sanctions); and  
q possible EU support to member states’ lawful responses.
 
From a legal point of view, EU member states uphold the 
international consensus that existing international law 
is applicable to cyberspace and base their work on the 
Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox on the existing international 
legislation and the principles agreed in the reports of 
the United Nations Groups of Governmental Experts (UN 
GGE).14 The 2015 UNGEE report offered a non-exhaustive 
list of the principles of international law that states must 
observe in their use of information and communications 
technologies. Among them are “State sovereignty, 
sovereign equality, the settlement of disputes by peaceful 
means and non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
other States”, as well as the respect and protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.15
The Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox is seen as complementary 
to the existing EU cyber diplomacy engagement. The 
implementing guidelines document is a step forward but 
does not in itself solve some of the challenges to reaching 
a common EU position, notably on the key issues of 
attribution and the use of sanctions.
2.  Attributing cyberattacks: A continuous challenge
In 2018, the UK and Denmark, together with the 
United States (US) and Australia, publicly attributed 
the NotPetya cyberattack to the Russian government16, 
while Canada stated that “actors in Russia” were 
responsible.17 New Zealand, Norway, Lithuania, Estonia, 
Latvia, Sweden, and Finland issued statements of 
support. Though several EU countries attributed 
this particularly destructive attack and the EU 
had already adopted its Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox 
decision and the accompanying implementing 
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an agreement on a collective attribution. The April 
2018 Council conclusions on malicious cyber activities 
only condemned “the malicious use of information 
and communications technologies (ICTs), including 
in Wannacry and NotPetya […]”, without attributing 
the attacks. While the EU member states failed to take 
collective measures against the actors behind these 
attacks, the attacks themselves put pressure on the EU 
to develop a functioning cyber diplomacy toolbox.
While the EU member states failed to 
take collective measures against the 
actors behind these attacks, the attacks 
themselves put pressure on the EU  
to develop a functioning cyber  
diplomacy toolbox.
 
New urgency was added by the hostile cyberattack 
carried out against the Organisation for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which was condemned  
by the October 2018 European Council. EU leaders  
also called for measures to “combat cyber and  
cyber-enabled illegal and malicious activities and build 
strong cybersecurity” and to “work on the capacity  
to respond to and deter cyberattacks through EU 
restrictive measures”.18 Moreover, the President of the 
European Council, Donald Tusk, Commission President  
Jean-Claude Juncker and High Representative Federica 
Mogherini issued a joint statement “on Russian 
cyberattacks”, condemning the “hostile cyber operation 
carried out by the Russian military intelligence 
service (GRU).”19 These events and reactions added 
additional pressure on the institutions to advance in the 
operationalisation of the toolbox.
The EU Council’s Horizontal Working Party on Cyber 
Issues (HWP), where EU member states’ representatives 
meet, is currently working on the cyber sanctions 
regime, the issue of attribution and the strategic 
communication to be deployed in case of malicious 
cyber incidents. Among these issues, attribution is 
probably the most difficult.
According to the implementing guidelines of the toolbox, 
“attribution could be established, based on an analysis 
of technical data and all-source intelligence, including 
on the possible interests of the aggressor”. Clearly, the 
issue of attribution is a complex one, influenced both by 
technical factors but also by (geo)political and economic 
ones. While the identification of the source of an attack 
poses certain technical challenges, it is feasible, as 
demonstrated by the various attributions already made. 
However, the political decision to attribute an attack to 
a specific country or branch of government and, even 
more, agreeing on a common diplomatic response, will 
likely continue to prove challenging for a body of 28/27 
countries. Some of the challenges that make a collective 
EU attribution difficult are specific to the cybersecurity 
sector while others, such as the requirement of unanimity, 
characterise EU foreign policy more generally.
While some cyberattacks are massive, many of them 
affect only some individuals or institutions. Getting a 
full picture of the impact is not always easy. The private 
sector is strongly impacted by malicious cyber activities 
but for commercial and reputational reasons, companies 
are often reluctant to publicise cyberattacks or to (fully) 
report incidents and losses, which means that valuable 
evidence and intelligence about threats and offenders is 
lost. Because the effects of cyberattacks are spread out over 
a large area and different jurisdictions, this can also lead to 
a reduced understanding of their full impact and thus to a 
lack of a shared cybersecurity situational awareness.
Moreover, only some member states have the cyber 
and intelligence capabilities and the political and 
administrative processes necessary to properly 
attribute cyberattacks. At different levels, these 
capabilities are to be found especially in the big member 
states such as the UK, France, and Germany but also in 
countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, 
Finland, and some CEE countries.20 Advanced cyber 
capabilities are especially necessary when dealing 
with sophisticated adversaries, such as the advanced 
persistent threat (APT) groups.
While the identification of the source  
of an attack poses certain technical 
challenges, it is feasible. The political 
decision to attribute an attack to a  
specific country or branch of government 
and, even more, agreeing on a common 
diplomatic response, will likely continue  
to prove challenging.
 
These groups, which have traditionally been associated 
with nation-state sponsorship, gain unauthorised 
access to a network and remain undetected for an 
extended period, posing some of the most serious cyber 
threats to the EU. The technical staff of the national 
intelligence services and the national CERTs (Computer 
Emergency Response Teams), which have followed 
their activities for years, are familiar with most of these 
groups’ digital signatures and indicators. Although some 
of the evidence is classified, much of it is publically 
available in open source, for example in detailed reports 
produced by private cybersecurity companies. Thus, 
while specialists are generally aware of the origin of 
many of the attacks, the main challenges regarding 
attribution emerge at the political level, concerning 
the question of public attribution.21
As mentioned, while the EU as whole has generally not 
attributed cyberattacks, some member states have. 
The UK has some of the best capabilities in this field and 
7has been more willing to attribute cyberattacks. In October 
and December 2017, the UK and the US governments 
publicly attributed the massive WannaCry cyberattack to 
North Korea and its government-sponsored hacking group 
known as the Lazarus Group.22 In December 2018, the UK, 
the US and a number of other countries held elements 
of the Chinese government responsible for an extended 
malicious cyber campaign targeting intellectual property 
and sensitive commercial data in Europe, Asia and the US.23 
This was the first time that the UK government publicly 
named elements of the Chinese government as being 
responsible for a cyber campaign. 
If the EU is just starting to address government-
sponsored cyberattacks, the US, benefiting from a 
less fragmented decision-making system and better 
equipped cyber agencies, have been more active both 
in bringing criminal charges against government-
sponsored hackers and in putting in place sanctions 
against them and their organisations. In September 
2018, the US Department of Justice formally charged 
a North Korean programmer for several cyberattacks, 
including for his role in the creation and spread of the 
WannaCry attack.24 In October 2018, the US Department 
of Justice announced criminal charges against seven 
Russian military officers for several hacking operations. 
These included the hacking of various sporting and anti-
doping organisations, a US nuclear power company, the 
Netherlands-based OPCW and the Switzerland-based 
Spiez Laboratory. Both the laboratory and the OPCW 
were investigating the poisoning of a former Russian 
agent in Salisbury in the UK.
3.   Challenges regarding collective action
One reason why the EU 27/28 struggle to take collective 
action is the fact that the Union’s decision-making 
process on foreign policy matters is cumbersome, 
requiring the unanimous decision of all EU governments. 
This is a high threshold that is often not easy to 
overcome, especially when decisions concern third 
countries with which some member states have strong 
links or interests.
One reason why the EU 27/28 struggle 
to take collective action is the fact that 
the Union’s decision-making process on 
foreign policy matters is cumbersome, 
requiring the unanimous decision of  
all EU governments. 
 
Having the technical and institutional capacity to 
attribute cyberattacks does not necessarily translate 
into the political will to ask for the support of 
EU partners and push for a common reaction. Big 
member states with advanced cyber capabilities also 
have complex international interests, which may  
require a delicate balancing act in relation to third 
countries. Sometimes, these member states may not  
be willing to deal with malicious cyber activities 
originating from third countries through the EU 
framework, sometimes counting to solve or leverage  
the issue on a bilateral basis. 
While the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox does not preclude 
action by individual member states, national initiatives 
are not always effective, even in the case of big 
member states. For example, although the UK has 
repeatedly approached China on this topic, it continued 
to be confronted with sophisticated malicious cyber 
activities originating in the Middle Kingdom.25 Bilateral 
dialogues on cyber issues between several EU member 
states and Russia also don’t seem to advance.
The EU member states also display different situational 
awareness and threat assessments in this field. This 
is due to, among other factors, the different levels of 
digitalisation of member states’ economies, the different 
scale of their cyber vulnerabilities, their different 
cyber capabilities and different political, security and 
economic priorities and interests. Moreover, most 
cyberattacks affect member states to different degrees, 
which results in different assessments of their gravity, 
a lack of a shared security perception, and raises issues 
regarding solidarity with a view to a common response. 
EU member states also display different 
situational awareness and threat 
assessments in this field.
 
On top of that, for a variety of reasons such as national 
security concerns, and a lack of sufficient trust and 
professional practice, member states’ intelligence 
agencies are also often reluctant to share classified 
information with all their EU counterparts. Since 
attributing a cyberattack to a third party or country can 
entail negative political or economic consequences, 
many countries are reluctant to agree to strong 
common measures based only on trust and incomplete 
information.26 Moreover, making a wrong attribution 
would have costs in terms of credibility. Among the 
big member states, Italy is the one mostly calling for 
caution in dealing with this issue.27 At the other end of 
the spectrum, Denmark and the United Kingdom have 
been publicly attributing cyberattacks and are pushing 
for a more ambitious EU policy.
84. Cyber sanctions: Tools to change behaviour
The issue of attribution is likely to remain a difficult 
one. However, the question of the use of sanctions also 
raises a range of problems. The EU will be able to 
adopt individual sanctions against perpetrators of 
a cyberattack without attributing that particular 
cyberattack to a state. At the same time, establishing 
a new sanctions regime and imposing sanctions for 
actions in a domain in which some definitions and 
international law are not well-established will require 
careful consideration. The proof supporting a 
sanction listing will need to be solid and able to 
withstand a challenge in court, while the goals of 
the sanctions should be clear.28
The implementing guidelines document mentions that 
restrictive measures could be used by the EU against a state 
that carries malicious cyber activity or is “responsible for 
the actions of a non-state actor that is acting under its 
direction or control”. However, the types of sanctions being 
discussed so far in the Council only target individuals or 
entities, not countries. The member states will have to 
clarify the scope of the sanctioning regime.
An October 2018 non-paper29 on cyber restrictive 
measures put forward by Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Lithuania, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, and the 
UK called for the urgent need to implement a sanctions 
regime to address malicious cyber activities. According 
to the document, the new sanctions regime is needed 
to change behaviour and to “strengthen the consensus 
around responsible state behaviour” by imposing 
consequences on criminal actors who are, in practice, 
beyond law enforcement. The change in behaviour can 
be achieved by signalling that malicious cyber activity 
has consequences, by constraining decision-makers who 
might consider using malicious cyber tools (for example 
by blocking their access to financial resources) or through 
coercion by imposing other meaningful consequences. 
The balance between the different sanctions’ goals (to 
coerce, constrain or signal) will differ from case to case. 
The currently debated EU cyber sanctions regime 
would follow on the recently approved EU sanctions 
regime addressing the use and proliferation of chemical 
weapons.30 However, the cyber sanctions will pose 
more complex challenges given that definitions and 
legislation about what is acceptable and what should 
be ‘sanctionable‘ behaviour are not as well established 
at the global level as in the case of the use of chemical 
weapons. Importantly, intelligence gathering will 
likely be excluded from the listing criteria, as there 
is no international treaty regulating cyber espionage in 
peacetime, or espionage for that matter. Among others, 
this would mean that that the member states and the 
companies affected will need to deal with the critical 
problem of industrial espionage through other means.
EU will be able to implement sanctions 
even without the collective EU attribution 
of an attack to a specific country.
 
The adoption of cyber sanctions also raises legal 
concerns linked to the level of proof needed to 
compellingly attribute an attack and support a 
sanctioning decision. In recent years, due to insufficient 
evidence, the EU Council has lost several cases regarding 
sanctions listings in front of the European Court of 
Justice. This adds to the caution of some member  
states regarding a cyber sanctions regime. It also 
demands that any decision on sanctions will need  
to be based on convincing evidence, able to 
withstand a case in court.
At the same time, the EU will be able to implement 
sanctions even without the collective EU attribution 
of an attack to a specific country. The October 2018 
non-paper mentions that any decision to impose cyber 
sanctions would not be dependent on “the public 
attribution of cyber operations which is a separate, 
sovereign political decision taken by member states”.  
Of course, if the individuals or entities identified  
as the source of a cyberattack have strong links to  
the state structures of a non-EU country, avoiding  
public attribution to that particular country  
would be difficult.
5. Operationalising the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox
EU member states will have to agree on the details of 
the new sanctions regime and the operationalisation 
of the toolbox. While the EU cyber sanctions regime is 
likely to be agreed upon soon31, the more difficult issue of 
attribution will likely remain a challenge. 
To put the toolbox into practice and improve their 
cybersecurity, member states will have to take a series 
of measures. This involve the strengthening of their 
cyber capabilities, raising awareness among the public 
and decision-makers but also creating and upgrading 
their internal governmental processes to better inform 
decisions. If they are to adopt common decisions in this 
area, member states need to work towards common 
threat assessments and a common culture of attribution. 
For this, improving the sharing of information is 
9fundamental. Working with the private sector and with 
international partners will also be key. The following 
sections will dwell into these issues and provide a  
set of recommendations. 
Strengthening cyber capabilities
Many EU countries need to improve their cyber 
capabilities, including in cyber forensics32, in order to 
improve their situational awareness, their ability to 
respond to and recover from attacks, and their capacity 
to attribute cyberattacks. Strengthening the cyber 
capacity of member states is one of the key enablers of 
collective diplomatic action at EU level. This involves 
investment in both human and technical capabilities. 
More investment into the training of cybersecurity 
specialists and their hiring and retention in public 
service is needed across the Union. Part of the EU funds 
for cybersecurity should also be used in the EU member 
states that are lagging behind.
Strengthening the cyber capacity of 
member states is one of the key enablers of 
collective diplomatic action at EU level.
 
Too often, cyber intrusions or the placement of 
malicious software in politically or commercially 
sensitive EU networks are discovered very late. 
Improving detection capabilities also involves investing 
in different technical capabilities, including the 
placement of sensors and digital beacons in relevant 
locations on the internet. To improve their defence 
mechanisms, EU member states should also increase 
their investment in cyber offensive capabilities as “it is 
very hard to do defence if you have no experience with 
offense.”33 This would be in line with developments in 
other parts of the world, including with allies such as 
the US34 or Australia35 which are moving towards more 
robust cyber defences and “forward cyber defence”.36  
The EU should avoid trailing behind.
Raise awareness and update internal processes
As the number and the impact of various types of 
malicious cyber activities has increased, so has the 
awareness of the public and of decision-makers. However, 
much more needs to be done to educate the general 
public, the private sector, the public administrations but 
also decision-makers, who in many cases have a very 
weak grasp of the subject.
Besides the necessary human and technical capabilities, 
member states should also adopt and update their 
internal procedures so that the work of technical 
specialists feeds into the decision-making process 
and into political decisions. Given the potential impact 
of cyberattacks, the issue should not be only left to a 
limited number of specialists who understand the topic 
and to working-level bureaucrats. 
Often, the political attention span dedicated to this topic 
tends to be short lived. While a cyberattack can lead 
to calls for decision-makers to take action, achieving 
attribution and gathering sufficient evidence usually 
takes time. Experience has shown that during this time, 
the issue is likely to drop from the political radar. Thus, 
following through after an attack, maintaining attention 
and allocating adequate resources to identify the source 
of the attack is key.
Appropriate measures and common diplomatic messages
When significant malicious cyber activities are 
identified, EU member states should consider the 
appropriate measures to be taken. Reaction to a 
cyberattack does not require certainty or near 
certainty regarding the origin of an attack, and 
many of the measures in the toolbox do not require 
attribution. Additionally, the choice of the measures 
to be taken will need to be tailored to the degree of 
certainty that can be established at a given moment. 
A variety of measures can be taken into consideration. 
Public statements following an attack, whether at the 
bilateral or local level (local démarches, cyber dialogues) 
or from Brussels (declarations of the spokesperson or of 
the High Representative, European Council conclusions 
or other statements) can be made without assigning 
responsibility. The country from whose territory the 
attack originates should be informed about the attack 
and required to provide information or take measures 
to stop the malicious activity. The EU has already made 
progress in developing common diplomatic messages 
that could be used by spokespersons or embassies in 
case of cyberattacks, but more needs to be done over the 
next months to advance further in this respect. When 
publicly assigning responsibility, the level of proof would 
necessarily need to be very high. 
Work towards common threat assessments and a 
common culture of attribution
Achieving an EU collective response to a cyberattack 
does not require that all member states have their own 
independent in-depth analysis of the technical data. As 
in other cases, member states can decide to support a 
common decision based on the evidence and analyses 
provided by one or a group of member states.
While the public attribution of malicious cyber 
activities will ultimately remain a political decision, 
one which will continue to be influenced by a number 
of considerations, member states and EU institutions 
should do more to reach a common threat assessment 
and develop a shared culture of attribution. For this, 
the sharing of information both between the EU 
member states and with the EU institutions is 
fundamental. This mostly concerns intelligence sharing 
between the member states, but a strengthening of the 
analytical capabilities at the level of the EU INTCEN37 is 
also necessary. INTCEN, working closely with the member 
states and EU institutions, is responsible for gathering and 
analysing all-source information available and preparing 
a political assessment about the events, which is meant to 
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provide the shared situational awareness needed for the 
decision-makers. In order to improve the decision-making 
mechanism, the use of the toolbox should also be exercised 
in table top exercises, involving the member states and the 
European institutions with responsibilities in this area.
Member states and EU institutions should 
do more to reach a common threat 
assessment and develop a shared  
culture of attribution.
 
While the implementing guidelines of the Cyber Diplomacy 
Toolbox do not attempt to harmonise the different methods, 
procedures, definitions and criteria used by the member 
states, “as attribution is a sovereign process”, it is necessary 
to continue the work on common definitions and taxonomy 
for cybersecurity incidents. Using different methods and 
procedures to analyse cyberattacks can have benefits, but 
taking consequential political decisions based on different 
definitions and criteria could prove challenging. 
More attention should also be given to establishing clearer 
criteria about what type of incidents need to be reported to 
authorities and to developing incentives for businesses and 
other private actors to (fully) report incidents and losses. 
The reporting systems need to be improved and provide 
the necessary degree of confidentiality. 
Calibrating the objectives of sanctions
While not reacting to cyberattacks would encourage 
similar behaviour, cyber sanctions will have to be 
used carefully and their goals should be clear from 
the start. The proportionality of the EU response is 
one of the principles of the toolbox. While a change in 
behaviour would not be the only purpose of sanctions, in 
many cases it would be the main objective. If sanctions 
are used and they do not have the necessary effect of 
changing the behaviour of the target government, entity 
or individual, the credibility of the sanctions regime may 
be affected. However, the EU might still choose to adopt 
and maintain the sanctions, as they would also have  
the role to signal to the target, to EU citizens and to  
the international community what the EU considers  
(un)acceptable behaviour in this field.
The possible reaction from the sanctioned party will 
undoubtedly also play a role in the political assessments 
prepared before a decision is taken. The attribution of 
attacks and the use of sanctions can potentially worsen 
relations and affect cooperation on cyber issues with 
the particular country concerned. For instance, in 2014, 
after the US government accused China of hacking 
American major industrial companies such as U.S. Steel 
and Westinghouse Electric and brought criminal charges 
against Chinese military officials, China cancelled  
US-China cybersecurity dialogue activities38, until the  
two countries reached a new cyber agreement in 
September 2015.
At the same time, not reacting to cyberattacks is likely 
to encourage similar or even more damaging behaviour. 
In this sense, attribution has a signalling role and even 
the existence of the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, with its 
sanctioning tool, points to the possible consequences 
of attacking EU entities. As such, it is intended to play a 
role in the calculations of potential aggressors, acting as 
a deterrent against bad behaviour. 
While cyber sanctions could be adopted without publicly 
attributing an attack to a specific country, if attribution 
is made, it would be damaging for the EU’s credibility if 
no measures would be taken. At the same time, given the 
difficulty of achieving unanimity among the EU member 
states in complicated cases, for the time being it may be 
more realistic to expect group attributions, in which a 
number of EU member states, but not all, would attribute 
an attack. While this would be better than no attribution, 
it would also signal that the EU is not managing to 
respond as a united actor.
Not reacting to cyberattacks is likely  
to encourage similar or even more 
damaging behaviour.
 
Any cyber sanctions listings will need to have clear 
objectives and EU member states will also need to 
agree on an exit strategy. The October 2018 non-paper 
mentions that sanctions could be lifted in response to 
a change in behaviour, the closing of an organisation at 
the origin of cyberattacks, a government taking stronger 
actions against perpetrators or making a political pledge 
to cease malicious activities. Reality will undoubtedly 
prove even more complicated and messier than these 
cases suggest.
Cyber sanctions listings will need to have 
clear objectives and EU member states will 
also need to agree on an exit strategy.
 
It is imperative that the future sanctions listings would 
be based on strong compelling evidence, which would 
withstand a case before the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ). Given the public nature of cases at the ECJ, the 
intelligence supporting a listing would need to be in the 
public domain, and thus cooperation with cybersecurity 
companies will be key for future work on this issue. 
Working with the private sector
More generally, EU member states should continue to 
invest in a close dialogue with the private sector. Most 
cyber activities take place over infrastructures owned and 
operated by private companies. The private sector is among 
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the most impacted by state-sponsored malicious cyber 
activities and private companies are often better placed to 
provide deep technical analyses of these activities. 
The Commission’s proposal for the establishment of 
a Cybersecurity Competence Community to involve 
research entities, industry and the public sector has the 
potential to improve private-public cooperation. The 
Community is expected to give input to a Competence 
Centre that, among other things, will provide financial  
support and technical assistance to cybersecurity  
start-ups and SMEs.
 Working with international partners
At the same time, the EU needs to continue to invest 
resources in global, regional and bilateral cyber 
dialogues, in the creation of common norms at the UN 
level and to try to broaden its use of confidence-building 
measures in this field. Reaching consensus at the UN 
level will not be easy given that discussions on the topic 
have been split up into two working groups set up as a 
result of competing resolutions, sponsored respectively 
by Russia and the US. This means developing relations 
with like-minded countries and investing in regional 
dialogues will be even more important. 
NATO-EU cooperation is also crucial in this respect. 
Cooperation should move beyond the organisation of 
parallel exercises to organising truly joint ones. The two 
organisations need to also improve their coordination in 
terms of detection, attribution and response. While NATO 
does not have the same political or economic tools to deal 
with cyberattacks below the threshold of an armed attack 
as the EU has, the two organisations have much to learn 
from each other and should coordinate their responses 
and messages in reaction to significant cyberattacks. 
Given the UK’s extensive capabilities, experience and 
activism in this field, Brexit will leave a significant gap 
in the EU’s cyber capabilities and will impact the Union’s 
ability to take common measures in this area. It will thus 
be vital for the two parties to continue to cooperate on 
cybersecurity after Britain’s exit from the EU.
Brexit will leave a significant gap in the 
EU’s cyber capabilities and will impact the 
Union’s ability to take common measures 
in this area.
6. Conclusions: The need for common EU action
Though there are different views and levels of ambition 
among the member states on the issue of the cyber 
diplomacy toolbox, substantial progress has been made 
over the last couple of years. EU member states have 
adopted a cyber diplomacy toolbox containing a number 
of measures, from preventive ones to the possible  
use of sanctions. They now have the responsibility to 
finalise the cyber diplomacy framework that would  
allow them to take collective measures against  
threats that will undoubtedly only grow in magnitude 
and complexity. 
Member states and EU institutions should 
do more to develop common threat 
assessments and a common culture of 
attribution of cyberattacks.
 
One of the key enablers for collective diplomatic 
action at EU level will be the necessary strengthening 
of cyber capabilities, both defensive and offensive. 
This will involve investment in human and technical 
capabilities, but also in creating and updating  
internal procedures so that the work of cybersecurity 
professionals feeds into the political decision- 
making process.
The attributions of cyberattacks will remain political 
decisions for national leaders to take and, like most 
foreign policy decisions, they will be influenced by 
diverse (geo)political considerations. However, to 
overcome hurdles of collective action and achieving 
unanimity in the EU Council for a common EU 
diplomatic response to cyberattacks, the member states 
and EU institutions should do more to develop common 
threat assessments and a common culture of attribution 
of cyberattacks. For this, the member states will need 
to upgrade their information sharing but also to use the 
Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox in table top exercises that 
simulate real-world scenarios.
While achieving agreement between the EU 27/28 
on attributing cyberattacks to non-EU countries will 
continue to be challenging in the short term, the EU 
member states will still be able to use most of the 
framework’s tools. These include preventive and 
cooperative measures even before a cyberattack takes 
place. During and after a cyberattack, the EU might 
employ measures such as statements and diplomatic 
démarches, with possible restrictive measures (sanctions) 
following later. These measures will have to be used 
carefully and based on strong compelling evidence.
While attributing attacks or adopting sanctions can 
potentially worsen relations with the particular country 
concerned, not reacting to cyberattacks is likely to 
encourage similar or even more damaging behaviour. 
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The EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, with its attribution 
and sanctioning tools, has a signalling role and will 
likely feature in the calculations of potential aggressors, 
acting as a deterrent. 
The EU will need to set up an enhanced 
cybersecurity cooperation with post-Brexit  
Britain and further develop EU-NATO cooperation 
in this field. At the same time, continued investment 
in confidence-building measures, in the development 
of norms at the UN level and in global, regional and 
bilateral cyber dialogues will be crucial to limit some 
of the more alarming developments occurring in 
cyberspace.
While the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox is complementary 
to actions at the national level, acting together would 
allow the member states to send a stronger deterrent 
message. By responding as a united actor to common 
cyber threats, EU member states will be able to defend 
their security, their political and economic interests 
and further enhance the Union’s credibility as an 
international actor.
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